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ANDERSON tI. MART

[47 C.2d

[So F. No. 19535. In Bank. Nov. 16, 1956.]

DOROTHY A. ANDERSON, R~spondent, V. MAUDIE O.
MART, as Administratrix, etc., Appellant.
[1] Divorce-..;....Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.
-Husband and wife made provisions for support of the wife
and a minor child an integral part of their property settlement agreement where they entered into the agreement for the
purpose of avoiding expense, delay, inconvenience and litigation
with respect to the settlement of their property rights and
obligations, released each party from all claims and demands
of the other, agreed that the wife should have the care, custody
and control of the child subject to the recognized premise of
law that they could control such custody only to the extent
that their agreement coincided with the order which any
eourt of competent jurisdiction might make for the best interest of the child, and expressly provided that the agreement
was to be a full and final settlement of the property rights
of the parties and of all claims which either might have
against the other.
[2] Id.-Permanent Alimony-Duration of Allowance-~ermfna
tion.-Where provisions of a property settlement agreement
between husband and wife establish that a provision" for
monthly payments for support and maintenance of the wife
and a minor child was an inseparable part of the agreement
and not a provision for alimony, and where at the time such
agreement was executed such payments did not terminate on
the husband's death or the wife's remarriage unless the agreement so provided, failure so to provide clearly indicates that
the payments should not so terminate and fortifies the conelusion that a separable provision for alimony was not intended.
[3] Id.-Permanent Alfmony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.A provision in a property settlement agreement between
husband and wife that monthly payments for support of the
wife and a minor child were to be subject to court approval does
not establish that they were alimony, and the fact that the
parties expressly recognized that they could not by tneir
agreement control the court's power to make orders for the
support of their child does not conflict with their expressed

[1] See Cal.J'ur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 217; Am.J'ur.,
Divorce and Separation, § 586 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3J Divorce, § 203; [2] Divorce, § 214;
[4J Divorce, § 215; [5] Judgments, § 115; [6J Divorce, § 204; [7]
Divorce, § 239; [8] Divorce, § 295.
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intention that as between themselves their agreement should
be final and conclusive.
ld.-Permanent Alimony-Duration of Allowance-Termination.-Provisions of a property settlement agreement between
husband and wife that "each party does hereby waive and quitclaim any right to share in the estate of the other party, either
under a Will or by the laws of succession, or by family allowance, or otherwise," and that "Neither party shall at any time
hereafter contract any debt, charge, or liability against the
property or estate of the other party, and, in the event either
party shall do so, he or she will save the other party harmless
and free from loss occasioned by such act," refer only to rights
or obligations not assumed or otherwise provided for in the
agreement and do not prevent the enforcement of contractual
obligations for support and maintenance of the wife given in the
agreement in consideration of rights of one spouse in the property or estate of the other growing out of the marital relationship, and hence do not preclude application of the rule
that payments agreed to as an inseparable part of the property
settlement do not terminate on the husband's death.
Judgments-Relief Granted.-The primary purpose of Code
Civ. Proc., § 580, declaring that relief granted to plaintiff,
if there be no answer, cannot exceed that which he shall have
demanded in his complaint, is to insure adequate notice to
defendant of the demands made on him.
Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Pleading.-Where plaintiff, in
her complaint for divorce, alleged that there was no community
property, "a property settlement agreement having been
entered into between the parties," where defendant, who admitted this allegation, was aware of the terms of the agreement and knew that it provided for a designated monthly
payment for support of plaintiff and a child subject to court
approval, and where the complaint contained no allegation
attacking the validity of the agreement and plaintiff prayed for
an order for payment of precisely the sums agreed to therein,
defendant had adequate notice that the award sought was that
provided for in the agreement, and the reasonable interpretation of such complaint was that plaintiff was not abandoning
the contract but was seeking the support provided therein.
ld.-Enforcement of Awards.-Where a divorced wife, in her
action against the administratrix of the former husband's
estate to enforce her claim to support money, did not secure,
and under the divorce decree could not secure, anything to
which she was not entitled under a property settlement agreement, defendant could raise no valid objection to its enforcement as a contract obligation.

276

ANDERSON t1.

MAR'!'

[47 C.2d

[8] Id.-Support of Ohildren-Orders Subsequent to Decree.Where a divorce decree orders payments for support of the
wife and a minor child, pursuant to a property settlement
agreement, the amount of payments cannot be reduced during
the child's minority, but the obligation to pay the amount
attributable to the child's support terminates on his reaching
majority, and when the decree is silent on the question of
allocation· the trial court may determine the allocation in
subsequent proceedings.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Contra
Costa County. Homer W. Patterson, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Action by a divorced wife against administratrix of former
husband's estate to enforce her claim to support money.
Judgment for plainti1l' reversed with directions.
Johnson & Harmon and Robert H. Johnson for Appellant.
Pasquinelli, O'Connor & Panelli and Timothy A. O'Connor
for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-On March 12, 1948, plainti1I Dorothy A.
Anderson and decedent William E. Anderson executed a property settlement agreement. On June 22, 1948, plainti1l' filed
an action against decedent for divorce. In her complaint she
alleged jurisdictional facts, extreme cruelty, her fitness for
child custody, and that she "does not have sufficient money,
means or property with which to support and maintain herself and the minor child of the parties hereto, and that the
sum of $60.00 per month is a reasonable and necessary sum
to be allowed said plainti1l' as and for the support and maintenance of said plainti1l' and the minor child of the parties
hereto." She alleged that "there is no community property
• • • , a property settlement having been entered into by and
between the parties." She prayed for a dissolution of the
marriage, for custody of the child, and that "the defendant
be required to pay to plainti1l' the sum of $60 per month as
and for the support and maintenance of said plaintiff and the
minor child" and "for such other and further relief as the
court deems meet and proper." There was no request that
the court approve the agreement or incorporate it in its
decree.
The decedent filed an answer in propria persona admitting
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all allegations except the allegation of extreme cruelty and
the allegations with respect to support. He made no further
appearance in the action, and it was tried as a default action.
On July 26,1948, an interlocutory decree was entered granting the divorce, awarding custody of the child to plaintiff, and
ordering decedent to "pay to plaintiff the sum of $60.00 per
month as and for the support and maintenance of said plaintiff and the minor child. . . . " It also decreed that the property settlement agreement "be, and the same is hereby approved and ratified, and the terms thereof are incorporated
herein with the same force and effect as if set forth in full
herein. " Decedent did not appeal, and on October 11, 1949, a
final decree of divorce was entered, incorporating the terms of
the interlocutory decree. Decedent remarried, and his widow,
Maudie O. Mart, who remarried after his death, is the administratrix herein.
On September 24, 1951, plaintiff and her attorney signed
and delivered to decedent a stipulation entitled in the court
and cause and providing that the interlocutory and final decrees "may be modified so as to provide that the defendant
pay to plaintiff the sum of Fifty Dollars ($50.00) a month
as and for the support and maintenance of plaintiff and the
minor child of the parties hereto, and that the above-entitled
court may cause to be made and entered herein its order so
modifying said decrees." The stipulation was not filed, and
the decrees were not modified, but thereafter decedent paid
plaintiff only $50 per month. On April 5, 1952, decedent died.
Plaintiff presented to the administratrix of his estate a claim
for $60 per month for her life expectancy. The claim was
rejected, and plaintiff brought this action.
The trial court found that the estate was indebted to
plaintiff on the property settlement agreement and that the
agreement was incorporated in and made a part of the decree
in the divorce action and that the provision for support therein
was an inseparable part of an integrated property settlement
agreement and therefore entered judgment for plaintiff for
$14,190 to be paid out of the funds of the estate in due course
of administration. That sum was fixed b~" the court as the present value of $50 per month for plaintiff's life expectancy. Defendant administratrix appeals.
In their agreement plaintiff and decedent provided:
"WHEREAS, there is one (1) child the issue of said marriage
of the parties hereto . . • ; and,
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"WHEREAS, the parties hereto desire to avoid expense,
delay, inconvenience, and litigation with respect to the settlement of their property rights and obligations; • . .
"NolV, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises, and
in consideration of the mutual promises and undertakings
hereinafter set forth, and intending to be legally bound, the
parties hereto do mutually agree and promise as follows:
"FmsT: That ... each party is hereby released and absolved from any and all claims and demands of the other,
including all claims of either party upon the other party for
support and maintenance as husband and wife, or otherwise,
it being understood that this instrument is intended to settle
the rights of the parties hereto in all respects, except as hereinafter provided. . . •
"SECOND: That any and all property acquired by either
party from and after the date hereof shall be the sole and
separate property of the party acquiring the same; and each
party does hereby grant to the other party all such future
acquisitions of property as the sole and separate property
of the party acquiring the same.
"THIRD: That each party shall have the immediate right to
dispose of or bequeath by Will his or her interests in and to
any and all property belonging to him or her from and after
the date hereof, and said right shall extend to all of the aforesaid future acquisitions of property as well as to all property
set over to either party under this agreement.
"FOURTH: That each party does hereby waive and quitclaim
any right to share in the estate of the other party, either
under a Will or by the laws of succession, or by family allowance, or otherwise.
"FIFTH: That each party does hereby accept the provisions
herein made for him or for her in full satisfaction of his
or her right to the community property of the parties, or
other property acquired after marriage by either party, and
in full satisfaction of his or her right, if any, to alimony or
support and maintenance. Neither party shall at any time
hereafter contract any debt, charge, or liability against the
property or estate of the other party, and, in the event either
party shall do so, he or she will save the other party harmless
and free from loss occasioned by such act."
Provisions were then made for the division of the property.
Bank deposits amounting to $5,726.87 and United States
War Savings bonds having an approximate maturity value
of $2,500 were divided equally; decedent received the better
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of two automobiles and a vacant lot, appraised in his estate
at $600; and plaintiff received the home, sold later for $6,000,
and furnishings.
Paragraph 15 provided: "It is understood and recognized
by the parties hereto that they can control the custody of the
minor child of the parties hereto only to the extent that their
agreement coincides with the order which any Court of competent jurisdiction may make for the best interest of said
child. Subject to such recognized premise of law, the parties
hereto agree that the Wife shall have the care, custody and
control of the minor child, with reasonable right of visitation
vested in Husband. "
Parag;aph 16 provided: "Subject to approval by any Court
of competent jurisdiction, Husband agrees to pay to Wife
the sum of Sixty ($60.00) Dollars per month as and for the
support and maintenance of Wife and the minor child of the
parties hereto, commencing forthwith and continuing in a
like sum each and every month thereafter."
Paragraph 18 provided in part: ". . • this agreement is
intended to be, and is, a full, final and complete settlement
of the property rights of the parties hereto and of all claims
which either party has or might claim to have had against the
other, were it not for this agreement. • • ."
Paragraph 19 provided: "This agreement can be modified,
cancelled, or rescinded only by a written agreement for that
purpose, executed by the parties hereto. • • ."
[1] In Messenger v. Messenger, 46 Ca1.2d 619, 628 [297
P.2d 988], we held that when "the parties have clearly expressed their 'purpose of fixing and adjusting their persoI).al
and property rights,' have provided that the provision for
alimony is 'for and in consideration of the permanent and
lasting division and settlement of all their property rights of
every kind and nature,' and the wife has waived 'all right to
future maintenance and support . . ., except as herein otherwise expressly provided,' the conclusion is inescapable that
they have made the provisions for support and maintenance
an integral and inseparable part of their property settlement
agreement. With such conclusive evidence of integration,
the provisions for support and maintenance or alimony would
be subject to modification only if the parties expressly 80
provided." It is abundantly clear from the second whereas
clause, the now therefore clause, and the first, fifth, and
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eighteenth paragraphs quoted above, that the agreement in the
present case falls squarely within the foregoing rule.
[2] Defendant contends, however, that the failure of the
agreement to provide for the termination of the payments
on the death of decedent or remarriage of plaintiff and the
provision that the payments were to be subject to the approval
of the court, compel the conclusion that the provision for
monthly payments was for alimony. Accordingly, she concludes that it could be modified by the court and that the
obligation it imposed terminated on decedent's death. If it
appeared from other provisions that separable alimony payments were intended, the omission of termination dates could
be explained, as defendant contends, on the theory that the
payments would terminate on the death of decedent (see
Miller v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.2d 733, 737 [72 P.2d 868] ;
Roberts v. Higgins, 122 Cal.App. 170, 171 [9 P.2d 517]) or
remarriage of plaintiff. (See Civ. Code, § 139.) The other
provisions of the agreement established, however, that the provision for monthly payments was an inseparable part of the
property settlement and not a provision for alimony, and
at the time the agreement was executed- such payments did
not terminate on the death of the husband or the remarriage
of the wife unless the agreement so provided. (Parker v.
Parker, 193 Cal. 478,480-481 [225 P. 447] ; Lane v. Bradley,
124 Cal.App.2d 661, 665 [268 P.2d 1092]; Anthony v.
Anthony, 94 Cal.App.2d 507, 511 [211 P.2d 331] ; Hamilton
v. Hamilton, 94 Cal.App.2d 293, 300 [210 P.2d 750] ; Estate
of Mesmer, 94 Cal.App. 97, 103 [270 P. 732] ; see Miller v.
Superior Court, supra, 9 Ca1.2d 733, 737; Pearman v. Pearman, 104 Cal.App.2d 250, 255 [231 P.2d 101]; Gosnell v.
Webb, 66 Cal.App.2d 518,521 [152 P.2d 463].) Under these
circumstances the failure so to provide clearly indicates that
the payments should not so terminate and fortifies the conclusion that a separable provision for alimony was not intended.
[3] The contention that the provision that the payments
were to be subject to the approval of the court establishes that
-In 1951 section 139 was amended to provide in part that "Except
as otherwise agreed by the parties in writing, the obligation of any party
in any decree, judgment or order for the support and maintenance of
the other party shall terminate upon the death of the obligor or upon
the remarriage of the other party." Since the agreement in this ease
was executed, and the decree entered, in 1948, the effect of the 1951
amendment on the interpretation of similar agreements and decrees made
after its enactment is not before us.
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they were alimony is likewise without merit. Thus the parties
had expressly recognized that any agreement affecting the
interests of their child was subject to the approval of the
court, and since the monthly payments were to be made for
the support of both plaintiff and the child, it was appropriate
that a provision for court approval should be included. The
fact that tbe parties recognized that they could not by their
agreement control the court's power to make orders for the
support of their child in no way conflicts with their clearly
expressed intention that as between themselves their agreement should be final and conclusive. (See Puckett v. Puckett,
21 Ca1.2d 833, 839, 842-843 [136 P.2d 1].) That this was
their understanding is further indicated by the fact that
when a modification was desired by decedent and agreed to
by plaintiff, it was negotiated pursuant to paragraph 19,
which provided that the agreement could only be modified "by
a written agreement for that purpose."
[4] It is contended that the provision in the fourth paragraph that •• each party does hereby waive and quitclaim any
right to share in the estate of the other party, either under
a Will or by the laws of succession, or by family allowance,
Of" otherwise," and the provision of the fifth paragraph that
"Neither party shall at any time hereafter contract any debt,
charge, or liability against the property or estate of the other
party, and, in the event either party shall do so, he or she
will save the other party harmless and free from loss occasioned
by such act" establish that the payments were to terminate on
decedent's death. (Emphasis added.) It is obvious that the.
quoted provision of the fifth paragraph is irrelevant in this
respect since it refers to any debt, charge, or liability to be
contracted hereafter and not to the obligations assumed in the
agreement itself. It is an obligation assumed in the agree·
ment itself that plaintiff is now seeking to enforce. It is
also obvious that the fourth paragraph refers only to any
rights to share in the estate not otherwise provided for in
the agreement. It is similar in its broad language to the
provisions of the second and third paragraphs in which each
of the parties waived all rights in any of the property assigned
to the other and any property to be thereafter acquired by
the other. Taken together these provisions make clear that
neither party should have any rights in the property or the
estate of the other growing out of the marital relationship.
The agreement was executed to settle and dispose of those
rights in exchange for those provided in the agreement, anel .
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manifestly the agreement would be self-stultifying if the mutual relinquishment of marital rights was so broad as to prevent the enforcement of the contractual obligations given in
consideration therefor. Accordingly, since it is clear that none
of these provisions was intended to prevent plaintiff from enforcing her rights under the agreement and since paragraph
four makes no distinction between rights accruing before or
after decedent's death, it has no bearing on the applicability
of the rule that payments agreed to as an inseparable part
of a property settlement do not terminate on the death of the
husband.
Defendant contends that the pleadings in the divorce action
did not put the property settlement agreement in issue and
that since plaintiff did not pray for any relief with respect
to property, the court had no power to approve the property
settlement agreement and incorporate it into its decree. (See
Burtnett v. King, 33 Cal.2d 805 [205 P.2d 657, 12 A.L.R.2d
333].)
Code of Civil Procedure, section 580, provides: "The relief
granted to the plaintiff, if there be no answer, cannot exceed
that which he shall have demanded in his complaint; but
in any other case, the court may grant him any relief consistent with the case made by the complaint and embraced
within the issue." If under the pleadings, the allegation of
plaintiff's need for an award of $60 per month for the child's
and her support and her prayer therefor may reasonably
be interpreted as made pursuant to the provisions of the property settlement agreement, the court, in basing its award on
the agreement of the parties, did not grant relief in excess of
that demanded in the complaint or inconsistent with the ease
made by the complaint and embraced within the issue.
[6] The primary purpose of section 580 is to insure adequate notice to the defendant of the demands made upon him.
(Burtnett v. King, supra, 33 Ca1.2d 805, 811; Pacific Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. McConnell, 44 Ca1.2d 715, 727 [285 P.2d 636].)
[6] In the present case it is clear that decedent was given
adequate notice that the award sought was that provided
for in the agreement. In her complaint plaintiff alleged that
there was no community property "a property settlement
agreement having been entered into by and between the
parties. " Decedent admitted this allegation, and he was
aware of the terms of the agreement. He knew that it provided for the payment of $60 per month for the support of
plaintiff and the child subject to the approval of the court.
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The complaint contained no allegatil)n attacking the va1it'lity
of the agreement (c/., Smith v. Smith, 40 Ca1.2d 461, 464 [254
P.2d 1]), and plaintiff prayed for an order for the payment
of precisely the sums agreed to therein. Under these circumstances, the reasonable interpretation of the complaint is that
plaintiff was not abandoning the contract, but was seeking
the support provided therein. The agreement contemplated
court approval of the provision for support, and in her allegations that the payments sought were necessary and reasonable.
plaintiff set forth her grounds for having the court approve
them.
[7] Moreover, the pleadings and the findings in this action
would support the judgment on the ground that decedent
was liable under the terms of the contract itself even if the
support provision of the agreement was not merged into the
divorce decree. At the trial plaintiff sought and secured a
decree awarding her support pursuant to her agreement. She
has never received larger payments than the agreement provided, and she has never attempted to secure the benefits
of an alimony award by seeking an increase in the amount
of the payments. Had she attempted to secure the benefits
of an alimony decree by attacking the jurisdiction of the
court to make the support award pursuant to the agreement,
she would have been estopped to attack the decree she procured. (Whitlow v. Superior Court, 87 Ca1.App.2d 175,
185 [196 P.2d 590] ; Estate 0/ Smith, 86 Cal.App.2d 456, 470
[195 P.2d 842]; Seymour v. Seymour, 18 Cal.App.2d 481,
483-484 [64 P.2d 168] ; see 1 Witkin, California Procedure,
412-413.) Since plaintiff did not secure, and under the divorce
decree could not secure, anything to which she was not entitled
under her agreement, defendant could raise no valid objection
to its enforcement as a contract obligation.
The trial court fixed the amount of the judgment as the
present value of $50 per month for plaintiff's life expectancy
of approximately 24 years. The payments were ordered, however, for the support of both plaintiff and the minor child.
[8] Although the amount of the payments cannot be reduced
during the minority of the child (Puckett v. Puckett, supra,
21 Ca1.2d 833, 843), the obligation to pay tile amount thereof
attributable to the child's support terminates on his reaching
his majority, and when the decree is silent on the question of
allocation, the trial court may determine the allocation in
subsequent proceedings. (Hopkins v. Hopkins, 46 Ca1.2d 313,
315-316 [294 P.2d 1] ; Meek v. Meek, 51 Cal.App.2d 492, 495,
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497 [125 P.2d 117] ; Putnam v. Putnam, 51 Ca1.App.2d 696,
699 [125 P.2d 525].) It should have done so in this case and
awarded plaintiff the present value of $50 per month for the
period of the child's minority plus the present value of the
amount attributable to plaintiff's support for the remainder of
her life expectancy.
The judgment is reversed with directions to the trial court
to redetermine the amount thereof in accord with this opinion.
Each party shall bear her own costs on this appeal.
Gibson, C. J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred.

)

CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in the
result reached by the majority insofar as it holds that the
minor child should not receive support from the estate of its
deceased father except until it reaches its majority and that
the trial court should be directed to determine the amount
to be allocated to it out of the total support payments until
that time. I dissent from that part of the majority opinion
which holds that plaintiff, the first wife of the decedent, is
entitled to receive any part of the support provided for from
the estate of the decedent.
I am of the opinion that Paragraph SIXTEENTH of the agreement is, and was intended by the parties, to be severable from
the balance of the agreement. Paragraph SIXTEENTH provides
that" Subject to the approval by any Court of competent jurisdiction, Husband agrees to pay to Wife the sum of Sixty
($60.00) Dollars per month as and for the support and maintenance of Wife and the minor child of the parties hereto,
commencing forthwith and continuing in a like sum each and
every month thereafter." The property settlement division
was set forth in preceding paragraphs and provided for an
almost equal division of the community property of the parties.
The provision for $60.00 per month was obviously not considered by the parties as equalizing the division of the property
and it was made expressly subject to court approval, which
the property division had not' been. It seems very obvious
that this case does not fall within the rule of the Messenger
ease (Messenger v. Messenger, 46 Ca1.2d 619, 628 [297 P.2d
988]) where a majority of this court held that the alimony
provision was clearly for and in consideration of the permanent and lasting division and settlement of all their property
rights of every kind and nature. No such provision is found
in the case at bar.

Nov. 1956]

ANDERSON

V.

MART

285

[47 C.2d 274; 303 P.2d 5391

)

In plaintiff's complaint for divorce she made the foliowing
allegations: "That there is no community property the
result of said marriage of the parties hereto, a property settle'
ment agreement having been entered into by and between
the parties"; and "That plaintiff does not have sufficient
money, means or property with which to support and maintain
herself and the minor child of the parties hereto, and that the
sum of $60.00 per month is a reasonable and necessary sum
to be allowed to said plaintiff as and for the support and
maintenance of said plaintiff and said minor child of the
parties hereto." In its interlocutory decree of divorce, the
trial court, in four separate paragraphs ordered (1) that plaintiff be granted a divorce; (2) that piaintiff have the custody
and control of the minor child; (3) that defendant pay to
plaintiff "the sum of $60.00 per month as and for the su.pport
and maintenance of said plaintiff and the minor child of the
parties hereto, said payments commencing forthwith and
continuing in a like sum on the 23rd day of each and every
month thereafter" (emphasis added) ; (4) that "IT Is FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Property
Settlement Agreement made and entered into between the
parties hereto on the 12th day of March, 1948, be, and the
same is hereby approved and ratified, and the terms thereof
are incorporated herein with the same force and effect as if
set forth in full herein." It therefore clearly appears that
both the plaintiff and the court considered that the provision
for monthly payments was a separate and distinct thing from
the property settlement. The original complaint did not
pray for court approval of the property settlement agreement
and the court specifically so found in the case at bar. The
complaint set forth, merely, that there was no community
property because it had been theretofore divided between the
parties and prayed for, on the ground of need, the sum of
$60 per month as support for plaintiff and the minor child.
Paragraph FOURTH reads as follows: "That each party does
hereby waive and quitclaim any right to share in the estate
of the other party, either under a Will or by the laws of
succession, or by family allowance, or otherwise." (Emphasis
added.) Paragraph FIFTH reads as follows: "That each
party does hereby accept the provisions herein made for him
or for her in full satisfaction of his or her right to the
community property of the parties, or other property acquired
after marriage by either party, and in full satisfaction of his
or her right, if any, to alimony or support and maintenance.
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Neither party shall at any time hereafter contract any debt,
charge, or liability against the property or estate of the other
party, and, in the event either party shall do so, he or she
Wt11 save the other party harmless and free from loss ocrononed by such act." (Emphasis added.)
The provisions of the agreement relating to the division
of property were incorporated by reference in paragraph
SIXTH of the decree and ratified and approved by the court.
The provision for the monthly payments for the support and
maintenance of the plaintiff and the minor child of the parties
was set forth in full in paragraph FIFTH of the decree of
divorce thus indicating that the court, as well as the parties,
intended the provision as something separate and apart from
the property settlement provisions of the agreement. This
provision was therefore merged in the judgment (Hough v.
Hough, 26 Cal.2d 605 [160 P.2d 15]). Each party did, by
the terms of the agreement, specifically waive any and all right
to share in the estate of the other, which provision is inescapable proof that the support payments were not to continue
after the death of the one obligated therefor. In the majority
opinion it is said that "It is also obvious that the fourth
paragraph refers only to any rights to share in the estate
not otherwise provided for in the agreement." (Empha"is
added.) In so holding the majority is writing something hlto
both the agreement and decree contrary to the intentions !)f
the parties and the court. The court treated the supp< rt
provision as something entirely separate and apart from 1 he
agreement. The property of the parties was evenly divid ed
and plaintiff in her complaint alleged that "there is no COlDmunity property" and prayed for support for herself and
the child on the ground of need. It would appear that ha,i
she considered the monthly payment provision as part of thtl
community property settlement agreement her complaint
would have been differently worded. In Pat·ker v. Parker,
193 Ca1. 478, 481 [225 P. 447], it was held that provision for
permanent alimony is founded upon the legal obligation which
the law imposes upon the husband to support the wife, and
"that obligation comes to an end upon the death of either
spouse. So, regardless of the language used by a court in
making a provision in its decree for the payment of alimony,
that provision ceases to be effective upon the death of either
spouse. But here we have a provision [based upon an agreement to pay the support during the lifetime of the wife]
based upon an agreement of the parties, in effect a contract.
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life annuity given in lieu of a division of the property of the
spouses. It rests not upon the obligation which the law
imposes upon a husband to support his wife, but upon the contract of the parties hereto." I have heretofore pointed out
that a construction of the agreement as a whole (as we are
bound to do) shows clearly that the monthly support payments
were intended to be separate from the division of property
and were not in lieu thereof; that each party waived any right
in the estate of the other; that the court specificaUy set forth
the provision for monthly payments in the decree which is
now the sum and substance of the parties' rights. In Roberts
v. Higgins, 122 Cal.App. 170 [9 P.2d 517], the court decree
awarded support and maintenance to the wife and the appellate court held that alimony terminated on the death of either
party. The conclusion appears inescapable that the provision
for support insofar as it relates to the plaintiff terminated
upon the death of her former husband and that she has no
claim against his estate for her support after his death.
So far as the minor child of the parties is concerned a
different problem is presented. We held in Taylor v. George,
34 Cal.2d .552 [212 P.2d 505], that "In California the rule
is that the obligation of a father to support his minor child
which is fixed by divorce decree or property settlement agreement, does not cease upon the father's death, but survives as
a charge against his estate. (Newma'll v. Burwell, 216 Cal. 608
[15 P.2d 511] ; Estate of Smith, 200 Cal. 654 [254 P. 567] ;
Estate of Oaldwell, 129 Cal.App. 613 [19 P.2d 9].)" In the
Newman case 8'Upra, the decree had provided that the father
pay a certain sum monthly to plaintiff for the support of the
minor child of the parties "until further order of court."
This court held that such an obligation continued after the
death of the father and during the minority of the child. "And
rightfuUy so, for it is the solemn duty of every father to
support his children during their minority, and if he fails
to do so, every principle of justice demands that they be thus
supported out of his estate." (Pp. 612·613.)
In view of the conclusion reached by me that the monthly
support provision of the agreement and decree was intended
by the court and the parties to be severable from the provisions relating to property division in the agreement and not
an integrated part thereof, I would reverse the judgment
with directions to the trial court to determine what portion
of the monthly payment should be allocated for the support
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of the child and the amount necessary to support him during
his minority. It follows from what I have heretofore said
that plaintiff is entitled to no part of the decedent's estate
and her claim against his estate for her support should be
disallowed.
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-I concur in the conclusion and,
generally, in the discussion by Mr. Justice Carter but do not
agree that the property settlement agreement was, or could
be, effectively incorporated in the decree by a mere reference.
(See my concurring opinion in Flynn v. Flynn (1954), 42
Cal.2d 55, 61-62 [265 P.2d 865], and my dissenting opinion
in Messenger v. Messenger (1956), 46 Ca1.2d 619, 637 [297
P.2d 988].)
In addition to Justice Carter's discussion it may be pointed
out that the provisions of the document entitled "Property
Settlement Agreement," whether considered alone or together
with the allegations of plaintiff's complaint for divorce and
the terms of the interlocutory and final decrees of divorce,
appear to preclude the construction placed upon the agreement by the trial court and the majority of this court. Rather,
in my view, the agreement, the complaint for divorce, the
divorce decrees, and the conduct of plaintiff and her former
husband combine to demonstrate that the monthly payments
were intended to be for alimony to the wife and support of
the child, and the contrary determination of the trial court
herein as to the alimony payments is untenable.
The complaint for divorce alleged "That there is flO community property the result of said marriage of the parties
hereto, a property settlement agreement hatting been entered
into • •• That plaintiff cloes not have 8'Uffi~ent money, means
or property with which to support and maintain herself and
the minor child of the parties hereto, and that • • . $60.00
per month is a reasonable and necessary sum . . • for the
support and maintenance of said plaintiff and said minor
child." (Italics added.) The complaint prayed for "$60.00,
per month, for the support and maintenance of plaintiff and
said minor child." (Italics added.) This is far from being
a prayer for an order directing specific performance of a
property settlement agreement, and following such prayer, the
interlocutory decree ordered the husband to pay $60 a month
"for the support and maintenance of said plaintiff and the
minor child," not as specific performance of a property settlement agreement. (Italics added.)
The above quoted allegations of the complaint for divorce
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and the order of the interlocutory decree are in accord with
the provision of the agreement (paragraph 16) that "Subject
to the approval by any Court of competent jurisdiction,
Husband agrees to pay to Wife .•. [$60] per month as and
for the support and maintenance of Wife and the minor
child." (Italics added.) The general provisions of paragraphs 1, 5, and 18, quoted in the majority opinion (pp. 278,
279, do not overcome the specific provision of paragraph
16 as to support.
Plaintiff's allegations in the divorce action that "there is no
community property . • ., a property settlement agreement
having been entered into," and that "plaintiff does not have
sufficient money, means or property with which to support
• • . herself . • .," are highly persuasive that what plaintiff
sought for herself in the divorce action was alimony, as such,
not specific enforcement of a property settlement agreement,
as to which no issue was raised. If plaintiff were in fact
seeking a decree ordering performance of a property settlement agreement she could and should have sought its approval
and a decree literally incorporating it in the judgment and
ordering defendant to perform its covenants.
The conduct of plaintiff in praying in the divorce action
for support for herself and the child is consistent only with
the view that the payments provided by paragraph 16 of the
agreement were, as to plaintiff, for support, that is, alimony.
Furthermore, plaintiff's subsequent conduct in "stipulating"
to and accepting a reduction in the amount of the payments,
although the agreement contained no provision particularly
directed to a change of such amount, indicates that plaintiff
as well as the former husband considered and treated the
payments as alimony and suppor1;, subject to court order
and not as a part of the division of property.
In these circumstances the rule quoted in the majority
opinion (p. 279) from Messenger v. Messenger (1956), supra,
46 Ca1.2d 619, 628, can have no application. Plaintiff
wife did not treat the support provision of the agreement
here as an "integral and inseparable part" of the property
settlement portions of the agreement; she treated it, her
former husband treated it, and in accord with their position
the trial court in the divorce proceeding treated it, as an
agreement for support and alimony in addition to, not as an
integral part of, the settlement of their property rights.
From the foregoing conclusion that the payments decreed
«c.M-1e
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to the wife are alimony and child support, it follows that the
obligation to make such payments terminated with the death
of the former husband insofar as such payments are alimony
(Miller v. Superior Court (1937), 9 Cal.2d 733, 737 [72 P.2d
868]; Parker v. Parker (19M), 193 Cal. 478, 481 [225 P.
447]; Hamilton v. Hamilton (1949), 94 Cal.App.2d 293,
298 [210 P.2d 750] ; Roberts v. Higgins (1932), 122 Cal.App.
170, 171 [9 P.2d 517]), although the obligation survives
during the child's minority insofar as the payments are child
support (TayZor v. George (1949), 34 Cal.2d 552, 556 [212
P.2d 505] ; Ne'UJ'l7Ul,n v. Burwell (1932),216 Cal. 608, 612 [15
P.2d 511]).
I would reverse the judgment with directions consistent
with the foregoing views.
Shenk, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December
12,1956. Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the
opinion that the petition should be granted.
.

